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Abstract
Thomas Paine’s writing helped spur the American colonies to independence and ensure that the
new nation would be a republic, not a monarchy. In light of the renewed interest in wealth taxes,
this article provides a close examination of Thomas Paine’s wealth tax proposal in the second
volume of The Rights of Man. Unlike Paine’s proposal to tax inheritances, his 1792 proposal to
tax wealth on an annual basis is often overlooked. The article identifies Paine’s various design
specifications, provides original estimates of the impact of Paine’s wealth tax proposal within
his own time period and as applied to billionaires today, and discusses ambiguities in the
proposal. The article then places Paine in conversation with the contemporary wealth tax policy
debate and demonstrates how Paine informs both the design and evaluation of tax policy. Lastly,
the article clarifies the relationship between democratic ideals and taxation, portraying tax
policy as a normative expression of republican ideals.
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Introduction
We live in a time of democratic decline and extreme wealth inequality.1 Yet policies to
address the interconnections between these issues are usually quite narrow: campaign finance
reform or restrictions on lobbying.2 Democracy requires a much more robust intervention.
Returning to the work of Thomas Paine, whose writing was instrumental in the founding of the
American republic and has inspired democratic reformers ever since, this article provides a close
examination of Thomas Paine’s often overlooked tax proposal in the second volume of Rights of
Man.3
Paine’s tax proposal has several striking features. First, it proposes a top marginal rate of
100%—in essence imposing a ceiling on the return on wealth. Second, the annual tax is assessed
based on the “yearly value,” as Paine calls it, of a taxpayer’s estate, equivalent to taxing the
entire rate of return to wealth. Paine understood that one of the luxuries of wealth is that it
produces income without labor on the part of the taxpayer. Paine is also explicit about the
corrupting influence of extreme wealth on democracy, and ties his tax proposal directly to the
goal of republican government. Each of these features is elaborated in Part I of our article.
In Part II, we provide original estimates of the impact of Paine’s tax proposal. We first
estimate the impact of his tax on 18th Century Britain by drawing from archival sources on estate
sizes at the time of his writing. We then apply his proposed tax to our contemporary age of
wealth inequality. We update his tax rate tables to current US dollars and apply his proposal to
the annual value of estates among the top ten billionaires in the United States. This Part also
identifies ambiguities with the design of Paine’s tax were it to be adopted today. Using Paine’s
policy goals as our guide, we also seek to resolve these uncertain design elements.
In Part III, we place Paine in conversation with the contemporary wealth tax policy
debate and demonstrate how Paine both informs design choices for current tax policy and
provides a framework to evaluate tax policy in terms of its implications for the health of
democracy. Remarkably, Paine’s 18th century tax brackets, when adjusted to 2020 dollars,

1

See, e.g., EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE (2019). See also, Miriam Berger, U.S.
Listed as a ‘Backsliding’ Democracy for First Time in Report by European Think Tank, WASHINGTON POST (Nov.
22, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/22/united-states-backsliding-democracies-list-firsttime/.
2
See Tabatha A. El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, 57 B.C.L. REV. 1127 (2016).
3
For commentary on Paine’s inheritance tax proposal in Agrarian Justice and its direct relevance to contemporary
tax policy debates, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, ANNE ALSTOTT & PHILIPPE VAN PARIJ, REDESIGNING DISTRIBUTION (Erik Olin Wright ed., 2006); Eric
Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 275 fn. 24 (2000). For Paine’s opinions on
inheritance taxes generally, see also, James Repetti, Democracy, Taxes & Wealth, 76 NYU L. REV. 825, 830-31
(2001). By contrast, our article is about Paine’s wealth tax proposal in the second volume of Rights of Man—a
proposal yet to be discussed in contemporary tax scholarship.
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closely align with the tax brackets proposed by Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders.
Paine’s top bracket applies to estates of approximately $1 billion. Assuming a rate of return of
around 5 percent, Paine’s 100 percent rate on wealth’s annual value is also similar to the rates
commonly proposed in recent wealth tax plans, revealing a previously unacknowledged
symmetry across time between contemporary tax proposals and one propounded by a leader of
America’s founding generation.4 These similarities also help illustrate the ways that a wealth tax
can be designed as an income tax, and vice versa.5
Our article concludes by clarifying the relationship between democratic ideals and tax
policy, articulating tax policy as a normative expression of republican ideals. Paine encourages
us to imagine how economic policy, including taxation, can and must be a bulwark for
democracy.

Part I: Paine’s Proposal to Tax the Yearly Value of Estates
A. Introducing Thomas Paine
Before turning to Paine’s tax proposal, a brief introduction to his life is in order. Born
into a middling artisan family in England, Thomas Paine emigrated to America in 1774 after a
string of failed careers and a lucky introduction to Benjamin Franklin. Within two years, he
became the best-read political author of his generation. His first pamphlet, Common Sense,
calling for American independence and republican government, sold hundreds of thousands of
copies in a country of 2.5 million people; his American Crisis series rallied support to the patriot
cause during the American Revolution. Paine’s writing is widely recognized as essential to
independence; as John Adams wrote, “Without the pen of the author of ‘Common Sense,’ the
sword of Washington would have been raised in vain.”6
Paine’s radicalism did not end with American independence. Traveling in Europe in the
early days of the French Revolution, Paine wrote a defense of the French republic, The Rights of
Man, that sold more than a million copies and “made Paine a figurehead for the new
revolutionary movements… sweeping the Atlantic world.”7 Threatened with a seditious libel

4

For a detailed account of three 21st century attempts to tax wealth, see infra Part III: 21st Century .
An income tax is generally understood as a tax on the accretion to new wealth, rather than to all wealth. See
generally William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113
(1974)(providing a clear account of the meaning of an income tax by distinguishing it from a consumption tax).
What our article endeavors to illustrate, through our analysis of Paine’s proposal and its similarities to contemporary
proposals, is the ease by which an annual tax on the returns to wealth can yield similar results to an annual tax on
wealth.
See also Glogower infra note 39 and accompanying text.
6
Jill Lepore, The Sharpened Quill, NEW YORKER (Oct. 16, 2006),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/10/16/the-sharpened-quill. Adams’s assessment of Paine’s role in the
revolution is all the more notable given that he was often a sharp critic of Paine. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, COMMON
SENSE: AND OTHER WRITINGS (Gordon S. Wood ed., 2003); Paul Desjardins, Thomas Paine: Father of Republics, in
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE (Daniel Edwin Wheeler ed., 1908).
7
SETH COTLAR, TOM PAINE’S AMERICA: THE RISE AND FALL OF TRANSATLANTIC RADICALISM IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 39 (2011).
5
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charge in Britain and elected to the national assembly in France, Paine moved to Paris and
became an active participant in revolutionary politics, but soon became a victim of the
Revolution’s increasingly irrational violence. From a French prison, Paine wrote the deist tract,
The Age of Reason, and once released, a social welfare proposal he called Agrarian Justice.
Returning to America in 1802, Paine was ostracized for his outspoken deism and for his public
criticism of George Washington. He died in 1809.

B. Paine’s Republican Ideals
Because Paine’s tax proposal in the Rights of Man extends from his political values, this
section briefly introduces Paine’s republicanism as a foundation for his tax proposals. While a
complete account of Paine’s political philosophy is beyond our scope here, any interpretation of
his tax policy proposal would be incomplete without considering how Paine saw the relationship
between the economy and the polity.
Paine was, above all, a republican: an opponent of monarchy, certainly, but more
fundamentally an advocate of human freedom through self-governance. In describing his most
popular American pamphlet, Common Sense, Paine writes that
the mere independence of America, were it to have been followed by a system of
government modelled after the corrupt system of English Government, would not have
interested me… It was to bring forward and establish the representative system of
government… that was the leading principle with me in writing.8
The rejection of hereditary rule is rooted in a broader commitment to self-determination. Paine
provides a succinct account of this core principle: “My motive and object in all my political
works, beginning with Common Sense… have been to rescue man from tyranny and false
systems and false principles of government, and enable him to be free.”9
In seeking to rescue mankind from oppression, Paine’s principal target was monarchy.
The corrupt and irrational rule of kings, Paine believed, was the primary cause of poverty and
inequality. Monarchs enriched themselves and their families at the expense of the common
people through unjust property and inheritance laws, regressive taxes, sinecures for aristocrats,
and constant war-making.10 Paine’s early work focused on dismantling the tyrannical
governmental structures that he believed were the fundamental source of injustice both political
and economic.

8

Thomas Paine, quoted in ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 75 (2005).
Thomas Paine, quoted in ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 75 (2005).
10
ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 93 (2005). In Common Sense, Paine writes: “In England
a king hath little more to do than to make war and give away places; which, in plain terms, is to impoverish the
nation.” THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 16 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961). In Rights of Man, Paine
writes that the consequence of consumption taxes imposed under the Hanoverian kings was “a constant increase in
the number and wretchedness of the poor.” THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 411 (Philip S. Foner
ed., 1961).
9
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Paine’s suspicion of government did not extend to commerce. Unlike many radicals of
later generations, Paine did not imagine that markets necessarily pitted economic classes against
one another.11 Having found a political home among the small artisans of revolutionary
Philadelphia, Paine saw commerce as integral to society, because trade (along with science)
encouraged inter-reliance and sympathy between people. Commerce “is a pacific system,” Paine
believed, “operating to unite mankind by rendering nations, as well as individuals, useful to each
other.”12
Paine’s advocacy for commerce did not blind him to the dangers of extreme wealth,
however. His vision of peaceful and beneficial trade was focused on the small farmer or artisan,
rather than the great merchants. Extreme wealth, in Paine’s eyes, “diminishes the spirit” of
“patriotism,” because rich men were willing to protect their fortunes by submitting to tyranny.13
What is more, he believed that oppression is “often the consequence” of wealth, even if it were
“seldom or never the means of riches.”14
Thus Paine wanted to free people from domination both political and economic, and he
recognized that these two systems of oppression were interconnected. Republican government
was always Paine’s primary tonic for economic ills. Starting with the Rights of Man, Paine began
to consider how government could reverse systems of economic domination that not only
oppressed the poor but corrupted politics. “The freedom of elections,” Paine thought, was
“violated by the overbearing influence” of inherited wealth.15 To defend against the injustices
that stem from economic inequality, Paine outlined the wealth tax we describe in detail in the
following pages. He also devised “an economic program as close to a welfare state as could be
imagined in the eighteenth century,” including public education, stipends for the support of
children and the elderly, and a jobs guarantee.16 Freedom, for Paine, meant both lifting the poor
from penury and dependence, so that they could participate as citizens, and eliminating the
“vicious influence of the aristocratical system” of wealth consolidation.17
Paine wished to overturn the systems of domination and oppression that he saw as the
inevitable consequence of monarchy and aristocracy. Taxation, he believed, could reduce the
concentration of wealth, and thereby help eliminate the corruption of concentrated power. With
that foundation, let us examine Paine’s proposed tax on the annual value of wealth.

C. The Motivating Principles behind the Paine Tax
Paine bases his proposal on two principles: one, that wealth should be taxed because
wealth is the only real luxury, and two, that there is a level of wealth that is so high that it should
be prohibited.

11

ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 89 (2005).
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 400 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
13
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 36 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
14
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 9 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
15
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 439 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
16
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 430-31 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
17
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 441 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
12
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In his first claim, Paine quite consciously subverts the arguments of his opponents.
Whenever taxes are proposed, Paine notes, the “tax-making gentlemen” in Parliament adopt the
“plausible language of taxing luxuries.”18 Paine takes particular aim at the “commutation tax,” an
immensely unpopular increase in the window duty.19 Window duties applied annually on
building occupants based on the number of windows on their dwellings. The window tax was
intended to be progressive, under the assumption that rich people had large houses with lots of
windows. In practice, however, windows were not an especially good proxy for wealth. As Paine
notes, the tax fell “heavy on the middle class of people.”20
For Paine, the limitations of the tax on windows is part and parcel of a general issue with
luxury taxation. It is a fool’s errand, he argues, to attempt to tax the particular items that
currently satisfy the whims of wealthy people, rather than the resources that allow people to
fulfill their every desire. Luxuries vary by time and place, leading to irrational differences in
treatment of identical products. “I know not why any plant or herb of the field should be a
greater luxury in one country than in another,” Paine comments. “The real luxury does not
consist in the article, but in the means of procuring it.” If taxes should be laid on unnecessary
excess, then they should be laid on wealth, Paine argues. “The proper object of taxation,” Paine
concludes is the “overgrown estate,” which is a “luxury at all times.”21
How big must an estate be to qualify as “overgrown”? Paine first defines luxury-level
wealth as a multiple of the annual amount required to support a family:
Admitting that any annual sum, say for instance, one thousand pounds, is necessary or
sufficient for the support of a family, consequently the second thousand is in the nature of
a luxury, the third thousand still more so, and by proceeding on, we shall at last arrive at
a sum that may not improperly be called a prohibitable luxury.22

18

THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 434 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
The 1784 increase in the window tax under Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger was known as the
commutation tax because it was a replacement (or “commutation”) for duties on tea, a policy intended to prop up the
struggling East India Company. Hoh-Cheung & Lorna H. Mui, William Pitt and the Enforcement of the
Commutation Act, 1784-1788, 76 ENGLISH HIST. REV. 300, 447, 465 (1961), http://www.jstor.org/stable/558296. In
treating his proposal as a replacement for the commutation tax, Paine was playing to popular sentiment. A cartoon
from 1785, for instance, shows, Pitt being accosted by working class women enraged by his tax policies. “Behind
Pitt is a house showing three first-floor windows, two of which are blocked up, the word 'Commutation' written
across them,” the British Museum notes. “From the third a woman empties a chamberpot on Pitt's head.” BM Satires
/ Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires in the Department of Prints and Drawings in the British
Museum (6794), https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1868-0808-5435. Commutation was not the
first unpopular effort to rescue the East India Company via corporate tax breaks; a previous effort provoked the
Boston Tea Party. Joseph F. Thorndike, Four Things You Should Know about the Boston Tea Party, TAX HIST.
PROJECT (Apr. 8, 2010),
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/1BB0C8F894BB490B852577020083A6F6?OpenDocument.
20
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 433 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961). See also Wallace E. Oates &
Robert M. Schwab, The Window Tax: A Transparent Case of Excess Burden, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y (Apr.
2014), https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/window-tax.
21
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 434 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
22
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 434 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
19
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Proceeding along these lines, an estate of twenty thousand pounds seems obviously
excessive, Paine believes. Indeed, he views his conclusion as all but unassailable. If the finance
experts in Parliament “can prove that an estate of twenty, thirty, or forty thousand pounds is not a
luxury,” Paine insists, “I will give up the argument.”
Paine’s definition of luxury is not exclusively about need, however. It is also defined by
effort. Paine wished to shield “property acquired by industry” from high tax rates, but believed
that there is a level of acquisition beyond where “industry can extend.”23 Even if one’s initial
acquisition is the result of hard work, the annual return on a very large estate is no longer earned
by work, Paine argues.
Having defined luxury in terms of need and effort, Paine turns to the appropriate level of
taxation for these estates. Ever the revolutionary, Paine proposes to eliminate entirely the luxury
of extreme wealth. Where wealth has extended far beyond what is needed to support a
household, and far beyond what can plausibly be ascribed to individual effort, Paine believes
“there ought to be a limit to property.”
His first justification for a wealth maximum is economic. Rebalancing taxes onto the
wealthy would, Paine believes, “remove the burden” of taxation to “where it can best be
borne.”24 In this, Paine is adopting a common principle of progressive taxation, the taxpayer’s
ability to pay.
But Paine also defends his proposed property limit in political terms. He believed that
extreme wealth, and especially inherited extreme wealth, undermined the ability of citizens to
choose their leaders. Via his tax proposal, Paine means to eliminate the appeal of primogeniture,
which he describes as “one of the principal sources of corruption at elections.”25
Primogeniture, the feudal rule of passing an entire estate to one’s eldest son, ensured that
large estates would not be divided at death, and thereby preserved the consolidation of wealth
that undergirded the landed aristocracy.26 For this reason, primogeniture (and the related policy
of entailing estates over multiple generations) was understood in Paine’s era to be incompatible
with republican principles.27 Paine himself describes primogeniture as “aristocratical.”28

23

THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 434 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 433 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
25
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 433 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
26
Contemporary research confirms that primogeniture made autocracies more stable. Andrej Kokkonen & Anders
Sundell, Delivering Stability—Primogeniture and Autocratic Survival in European Monarchies 1000–1800, 108
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 2, 438, 453 (2014).
27
Jefferson successfully eliminated the entail in Virginia. Holly Brewer, Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia:
‘Ancient Feudal Restraints’ and Revolutionary Reform, 54 WM. & MARY Q. 2, 307, 346, (1997). Historians
generally see the end of entail as one of the tangible economic achievements of the American revolution. Claire
Priest, The End of Entail: Information, Institutions, and Slavery in the American Revolutionary Period, 33 LAW &
HIST. REV. 277–319 (2015).
28
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 434 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
24
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Paine wishes to “supercede”29 primogeniture by making it economically irrational to give
your whole estate, if very large, to a single person – or, for that matter, to have a very large estate
at all.

D. The Elements of the Paine Tax
Paine’s tax proposal is intended to ensure that there is an amount of wealth beyond which
no one can continue to accrue. He envisions a regular application of marginal rates that, at the
very top, entirely taxes away the return to extreme wealth.30
He applies his tax to “all estates of the clear yearly value of fifty pounds, after deducting
the land tax, and up.”31 His graduated tax starts at 1.25% on an estate’s produce over 50 pounds
and rises to 100% of the produce over 23,000 pounds. As he notes, “At the twenty-third thousand
the tax becomes twenty shillings in the pound [100%], and, consequently, every thousand
beyond that sum, can produce no profit.” Large property owners will respond, Paine believes, by
“dividing the estate.”32 Given that “the richest in every nation have poor relations,” he expects
the result to be greater economic equality.
Paine includes detailed tables that explain the effect of his tax on revenue in each bracket.
He provides his tax table in the terms that would have made sense to his audience at the time:
pounds (£), shillings (s) and pence (d). Until 1971, there were 20 shillings to the British pound
and 12 pence to the shilling, for a total of 240 pence to the pound. For a modern reader, this can
be less than intuitive; the following table translates his calculations into percentages.33

29

THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 434 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
Paine is not explicit on the timing of his tax but given his revenue estimates, that he uses a per annum measure of
the return on the estates, and that he wishes the tax to reach the point of “prohibition,” it is clear that the “regular”
application of the tax that he envisions is annual.
31
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 434 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
32
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 436 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
33
In most editions of the Rights of Man, there are several minor errors of calculation in the tax tables. For example,
a tax of 3d per pound on an estate of 500 pounds per annum is often listed as seven pounds and five shillings; it
should be six pounds and five shillings. The errors are present in editions as far back as 1792, including the early
Jordan editions that are typically seen as authoritative and the Symonds “cheap” edition that was edited by Paine
himself. For clarity, the errors are corrected in Table 1.
30
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Table 1: Thomas Paine’s Tax Proposal

At top of bracket
Estates
producing
Average
revenue over
Tax per
Marginal tax
“Total tax
tax rate
50£ per annum pound
rate (%)
subtracted”
“Net produce”
(%)
50 to 500
0s 3d
1.25
£ 6 5s
£493 15s
1.25
1000
0s 6d
2.5
£18 15s
£ 981 5s
1.88
2000
0s 9d
3.75
£ 56 5s
£ 1943 15s
2.81
3000
1s 0d
5
£ 106 5s
£ 2893 15s
3.54
4000
1s 0d
7.5
£ 181 5s
£ 3818 15s
4.53
5000
2s 0d
10
£ 281 5s
£ 4718 15s
5.63
6000
3s 0d
15
£ 431 5s
£ 5568 15s
7.19
7000
4s 0d
20
£ 631 5s
£ 6368 15s
9.02
8000
5s 0d
25
£ 881 5s
£ 7118 15s
11.02
9000
6s 0d
30
£ 1181 5s
£ 7818 15s
13.13
10000
7s 0d
35
£ 1531 5s
£ 8468 15s
15.31
11000
8s 0d
40
£ 1931 5s
£ 9068 15s
17.56
12000
9s 0d
45
£ 2381 5s
£ 9618 15s
19.84
13000
10s 0d
50
£ 2881 5s
£ 10118 15s
22.16
14000
11s 0d
55
£ 3431 5s
£ 10568 15s
24.51
15000
12s 0d
60
£ 4031 5s
£ 10968 15s
26.88
16000
13s 0d
65
£ 4681 5s
£ 11318 15s
29.26
17000
14s 0d
70
£ 5381 5s
£ 11618 15s
31.65
18000
15s 0d
75
£ 6131 5s
£ 11868 15s
34.06
19000
16s 0d
80
£ 6931 5s
£ 12068 15s
36.48
20000
17s 0d
85
£ 7781 5s
£ 12218 15s
38.91
21000
18s 0d
90
£ 8681 5s
£ 12318 15s
41.34
22000
19s 0d
95
£ 9631 5s
£ 12368 15s
43.78
23000
20s 0d
100
£ 10631 5s
£ 12368 15s
46.22

There are several features of Paine’s proposal that are worthy of note, including the
system of brackets, the tax base, and the estimated revenue garnered from the tax.
Paine’s use of brackets and marginal rates was quite cutting edge in the 1790s.34 E.R.A.
Seligman identifies only a few minor instances of bracketed income taxes that predate the Rights
34

Paine neglects to apply the bracket principle at the first step of his tax. An estate producing less than 50 pounds in
revenue is excluded from the tax, but for an estate worth 50 pounds or more, the first 50 pounds of revenue is not
excluded from the tax: “An estate of £50 per an. At 3d per pound pays £0 12 6”, which is 144+6=150 pence, i.e., the
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of Man.35 Most tax systems of the time were full of “notches,” where small changes in the taxed
item resulted in immense changes in one’s tax liability. Indeed, one of the reasons the window
tax was so disliked is that it failed to take account of marginal effects. For a time, its rates
applied to each window, but only for houses with ten or more windows – resulting,
unsurprisingly, in a strong incentive to board up the 10th window.36 Marginal taxation was so
novel in 1792 that the mathematician Nicolas de Condorcet took pains to describe its operation
in his essay of that year, Sur l’impôt progressif.37 It is plausible, even likely, that Paine was
influenced in his thinking by Condorcet, his friend and collaborator in revolutionary France.
In applying his tax to “estates,” Paine appears to wish his tax to touch all forms of wealth
that are not wage labor. Given that “these gentlemen law-makers and tax-makers” have limited
the “poor pittance which personal labor can produce,” it is only right that the ruling elite should
have a limitation of their own, on “property they never acquired (nor probably any of their
ancestors), and of which they have made so ill use.”38
Nonetheless, though he intends to limit property, Paine’s brackets are based on the rate of
return to wealth, not a calculation of total wealth. Paine intends his tax to come into effect on
estates worth over 50 pounds in annual “produce,” as he refers to it. This raises an important
question as to whether Paine’s tax proposal is more appropriately described as an income tax or a
wealth tax. To 21st Century audiences, his plan appears as an income tax in that it applies to
returns to wealth, rather than the underlying corpus of the estate. However, Paine is quite explicit
that wealth is his primary object of concern; those with only wage income are not subject to the
tax. We are content to refer to his proposal as a tax on wealth, though we recognize that the
distinction between the two tax bases can be somewhat porous. Indeed, our analysis of Paine’s
proposal in contrast to the Warren and Wyden proposals also further illustrates the ease by which
a wealth tax can be an income tax and vice versa.39

3d per pound rate applied to the whole £50. Thus, while an estate of £49 pays nothing, an estate of £50 pays 12s 6d,
leaving a value of £49 7s 6d. The 50th pound is taxed at 62.5%. This rate structure is similar to the commutation tax
at the time, where the first nine windows did not create a tax liability, but the tax on the tenth window triggered a per
window tax on all preceding nine windows.
35
“[I]n 1742 the Elector Frederick Augustus, of Saxony, established a progressive general income tax, in six classes,
with rates varying from one to eight per cent. The tax was so arranged that each increment of the income paid a
separate rate according to the class to which that increment belonged.” Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman,
Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 AM. ECON. ASS’N Q. 1, 26 (1908). Seligman also notes a few rare
instances of progressive taxes in the 17th Century, including a property tax regime in Switzerland and a proposed
progressive tax bracket structure in Spain.
36
Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Window Tax: A Transparent Case of Excess Burden, LINCOLN INST.
OF LAND Pol’y (Apr. 2014), https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/window-tax.
37
Paine and Condorcet’s contemporary, Thomas Jefferson, struggled to describe the concept of marginal rates in a
letter to James Madison, proposing to “tax the higher portions of property in geometrical progression as they rise.”
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950), https://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch15s32.html.
38
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 440 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
39
This observation is best described by Ari Glogower, who coined the term “wealth integration techniques” for
income tax features that produce wealth tax effects. He offers a typology of methods for adding wealth tax features
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In using the return to wealth as a proxy for the total value of an estate, Paine is in keeping
with his contemporaries. Wealth in that era, and especially real estate wealth,40 was commonly
described in terms of “thousands a year,” rather than its lump sum value.41 Calculating total
wealth would have been a nearly impossible task in a society where much of real estate wealth
never came onto the market; the vast wealth of the aristocracy was often entailed and therefore
literally unsaleable.42 As economist and historian Gabriel Ardant notes, “tax collection and
assessment are indissolubly linked to an exchange economy.”43 The relevant measure of wealth
for tax purposes was at the time its rate of return to the owner. Where British property taxes were
graduated, the base was sometimes determined based on an annual rent value. The 1778 tax on
inhabited houses, for example, had two rates: 6d/£ (2.5%) for houses with an annual value of
below £50, and 1s/£ (5%) for houses valued over £50 per annum.44 Describing property in terms
of its annual return was not a new feature of the Paine plan.
Finally, Paine makes some estimation of the revenue from his tax. He intends the tax to
replace the commutation tax, with a revenue of about £770,000 annually. Should his tax
outproduce the commutation tax, he suggests his taxes be lowered “upon estates under two or
three thousand a year.”45 As this amendment suggests, revenues are not the main purpose of the
tax, from Paine’s perspective; the “object is not so much the produce of the tax as the justice of
the measure.”46 That justice comes in the form both of a fairer tax liability across economic
strata, and the change in ownership and inheritance patterns Paine believes will result from his
tax system.
In prioritizing behavioral change over revenues, Paine is in essence treating his tax as a
Pigouvian tax. Were his tax to successfully reduce wealth concentration, it would necessarily
raise less revenue – but this would, for Paine, be a sign of success, rather than failure. As such,
his work prefigures not only that of later proponents of progressive taxation, but modern

to an income tax. Ari Glogower, A Constitutional Wealth Tax, 118 MICH. L. REV. 717 (2020). See also, John
Brooks, The Definitions of Income, 71 TAX. L. REV. 253 (2018) (“any operative definition of income is essentially a
political choice, even when we claim to be using a pure definition, and any definition thus inherently incorporates
normative views about, for example, justice, social policy, and economics. Ultimately, ‘income’ is whatever society
wants it to be in order to achieve a result that the democracy believes to be appropriate and just.”). The scholarly
debate over what constitutes “income” is not limited to the 21st Century. See e.g. Boris I. Bittker, A Comprehensive
Tax Base as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925 (1967).
40
As an example of the difference in how real and other property were described, see this dialogue from the 1763
comedy, The Discovery by Frances Sheridan: “Suppose the widow Knightly, with a real estate of three thousand a
year, and a personal one of fifty thousand pounds, should have taken a fancy to you…” in John Bell, BRITISH
THEATRE, VOLUME 29, 26 (1792).
41
Early property requirements for voting also used income per year for measuring a land’s value, with ownership of
property producing forty shillings per year serving as the threshold for the franchise. See WILLIAM CHILTON,
AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 7 (1960).
42
See WILLIAM CORNISH ET AL., LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND: 1750-1950 130 (2019).
43
THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 166 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975).
44
Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 AM. ECON. ASS’N Q. 1, 27
(1908).
45
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 436 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
46
THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 436 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
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economic analyses suggesting that high rates of progressive taxation affect the pre-tax
distribution of income.47

Part II: Original Estimates of the Paine Tax
A. Estimate of Paine’s Tax in 18th Century Britain
A plan calculated in shillings and pence that describes wealth in terms of “thousands per
year” and is motivated in part by the arcane inheritance law of primogeniture — on first read,
Paine’s tax plan might seem quite distant from contemporary tax issues in the United States. But
a closer consideration of who Paine was intending to tax in 1792 reveals how closely connected
the economic and political concerns of Paine’s day are to those of our own time.
Paine’s first non-zero bracket starts at £50, with a tax of 1.25%. What percentage of
British households would have been liable for some amount of tax, under Paine’s proposal? Data
about the income and wealth distribution of 18th Century Britain are limited. Conveniently,
however, Britain did implement an income tax less than a decade after Paine was writing. Prime
Minister William Pitt introduced the income tax to fund Britain’s war against Napoleon.48 In
1800, 320,75949 taxpayers, about 12% of households,50 paid Pitt’s income tax.
The incidence of the Pitt income tax provides a relatively good ballpark estimate of the
breadth of the Paine wealth tax proposal. Though Pitt’s lowest taxed bracket started at £60,
rather than £50, this apparent difference disappears after taking account of inflation.51 Pitt’s plan
also included a variety of deductions and family allowances,52 while Paine only explicitly
deducts the land tax.53 However, if Pitt’s deductions would shrink the breadth of his tax relative
to Paine’s, the overall base of Paine’s tax is narrower; Pitt’s tax applied to all kinds of income,54
while Paine is concerned only with the revenue from “estates.” That said, the vast majority of
people who worked for wages or a salary did not make enough money to owe money under Pitt’s

47

Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of
Three Elasticities, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 1, 230, 271, (2014).
48
A Tax to Beat Napoleon, HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE & CUSTOMS,
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20130127153155/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/history/taxhis1.htm#t
op.
49
This is substantially smaller than the number of taxpayers expected to pay the tax; contemporary expectations put
number of liable households between 472,117 and 662,250. Whether the estimates were overly optimistic or the tax
was widely evaded is a subject of debate. T.V. Jackson, British Incomes Circa 1800, ECON. HIST. REV., 257, 283
(1999).
50
T.V. Jackson, British Incomes Circa 1800, ECON. HIST. REV., 257, 265-66 (1999).
51
All inflation data based on the “relative income” inflation measure available at: Five Ways to Compute the
Relative Value of a U.K. Pound Amount, 1270 to Present, https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ukcompare/
(last visited Feb. 7, 2022).
52
T.V. Jackson, British Incomes Circa 1800, ECON. HIST. REV., 257, 259 (1999).
53
There are indications in Paine’s brief proposal that the author would have been amenable to various deductions.
See, for instance, Paine’s use of the phrase “clear yearly value” and concern about “support of a family.” Paine does
not discuss the deductibility of losses.
54
T.V. Jackson, British Incomes Circa 1800, ECON. HIST. REV., 257, 258 (1999).
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income tax.55 Leaving a margin for these policy differences, we might reasonably assume that
Paine’s proposal would have touched 10-15% of the population.
Despite their similar bases, however, Paine proposal and Pitt’s tax have extremely
different revenue implications. Paine expected his tax’s annual revenue to about £700,000.56 In
its first year, Pitt’s tax raised nearly £6 million.57 The difference in revenue is readily explained;
Paine’s tax is far lower over the vast majority of the economic spectrum. Figure 1 illustrates the
difference in the targeting of the Paine and Pitt proposals.

Figure 1: Tax rates under Pitt tax and Paine proposal.58
The Pitt tax rates rose rapidly to 10% and then applied a flat rate on all incomes over
£200. Paine’s proposed rates rose slowly over a much longer range; the marginal rate of Paine’s

55

Pitt did not even consider regular laborers in his revenue estimates, though he did estimate income from
“professions” at £2 million, and trade “in which artisans are engaged” at £10 million, out of a total of £125 million.
S.J. Thompson, The First Income Tax, Political Arithmetic, and the Measurement of Economic Growth, 66 ECON.
HIST. REV. 873, 880-81 (2013).
56
Paine expects his tax to raise an amount similar to or less than the commutation tax, which he pegs at £771,657 a
year. Indeed, the window tax had an average annual yield of L769,000 in the period 1788-1792. See Table 5 in
Patrick K. O'Brien, The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815, ECONOMIC HIST. REV. 1, 32 (1988).
57
A Tax to Beat Napoleon, HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE & CUSTOMS,
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20130127153155/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/history/taxhis1.htm#t
op.
58
Bracket thresholds for Pitt are slightly deflated to account for differences in relative income between 1792 and
1799. Estimates of the top 1% and top 0.25% of incomes from Shaviro 2021 and Delong 2003, respectively.
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plan only reaches 10% at £5000, an amount one hundred times the income of the average farm
laborer or artisan.59
Thus Paine’s tax is tightly focused on the most extreme fortunes of his era. Paine’s
marginal rate rises over 50% only at £13,000; approximately 200 households in the entire
country were this wealthy.60 Only a few dozen estates, at most, would be subject to Paine’s
highest rates. Patrick Colquhoun, a Scottish statistician in the early 19th Century, attempted to
calculate the average income for a wide array of social groups, from “royalty” to “vagrants.”
Colquhoun put the royal family’s annual income at £146,000 in 1812 and that of the Prince
Regent at £172,000, but the average income of the other ten “remaining princes and princesses of
the blood, both lineal and collateral” at a mere £18,300 per household.61 His wealthiest non-royal
group, the 316 households headed by “temporal peers” (e.g. dukes and earls), was estimated to
have an average income of only £10,000 a year. Applying Paine’s unadjusted rates to these
incomes would put the minor royals in the 75% marginal tax bracket, while the average duke or
earl would be paying 35% on his last pound.
Applying Paine’s tax rates to Colquhoun’s averages is somewhat misleading, however,
because of the large range of incomes within Colquhoun’s social groups. A 20th Century analysis
found that the four hundred “great landlords,” who owned a fifth of all the land in England,62 had
an average income of £10,000 in 1790, with a range between £5,000 and £50,000;63 the Earl of
Derby’s estate was worth £40,000 a year.64 The other great class of wealth was mercantile; the
“major merchants” in England had estates worth “between £200,000 and £800,000,” which, at
5% annual return, would provide incomes between £10,000 and £40,000.65 Records from Pitt’s
income tax provide some specific examples of those with wealth of this magnitude. Among
2,508 surviving records of the Pitt income tax,66 seven taxpayers reported incomes over £18,000,
Paine’s 75% tax threshold, and two, the Duke of Devonshire and the Duke of Northumberland,
had incomes over £23,000.67 There clearly were families to whom Paine’s top tax rates would
have applied.

59

See Table 4 in PATRICK COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON THE WEALTH, POWER, AND RESOURCES, OF THE BRITISH
EMPIRE (1814).
60
GREGORY CLAEYS, THOMAS PAINE: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 81 (1989).
61
British royalty are to this day exempt from a variety of British laws, including tax laws. Taxation, ROYAL.UK:
ROYAL FINANCES, https://www.royal.uk/royal-finances-0 (last visited Feb. 7, 2022). Paine makes no specific
indication that he intends to include the royal family in his proposal. In deference to Paine’s anti-monarchical and
republican commitments, however, one might reasonably assume that Paine’s ideal tax plan included taxes upon the
royal family.
62
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 123 (2011).
63
GORDON EDMUND MINGAY, ENGLISH LANDED SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 26 (2013).
64
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 112 (2011).
65
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 112 (2011).
66
Jackson, supra note 49 (describing this set of records of named taxpayers and their tax payments).
67
Contemporary accounts suggest that the Northumberland estate was almost unequalled outside of the royal family.
David Cannadine, The Landowner as a Millionaire: The Finances of the Dukes of Devonshire, c.1800-c.1926, 25
AGRIC. HIST. REV. 77, 77-97 (1977) (“In 1819, the American Ambassador recorded that the ‘four greatest incomes
in the kingdom’ belonged to the Duke of Northumberland, Earl Grosvenor, the Marquess of Stafford, and the Earl of
Bridgewater, each of whom was reputed to possess ‘one hundred thousand pounds, clear of everything.’”).
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For these estates, Paine’s tax would have been heavy indeed. Supposing they paid the tax
rather than (as Paine expected) dividing their estates, Devonshire, with an income of £50,000,
and Northumberland, with an income of £60,200, would have each been left with £12,369 after
tax. In other words, Devonshire’s average tax rate would have been 75%; Northumberland’s
would have been 79%.
It would be difficult to overstate the cumulative effect of such a tax on the British wealth
distribution over succeeding years. By way of illustration, however, we note that the titled
descendants of the wealthiest aristocrats of the late 18th Century remain on Britain’s “Rich List”
today; the current Duke of Devonshire has a net worth of £870 million, and the Duke of
Northumberland’s estate was recently valued at £365 million.68 If the distribution of wealth itself
has striking staying power, surely Paine’s tax proposal has contemporary relevance as well. In
the following section, we consider how an updated Paine wealth tax would apply to the wealth
distribution of the United States.

B. Ambiguous Design Elements of Paine’s Tax
Paine did not provide statutory language for his tax proposal, nor do we have the
accumulated guidance that comes with the actual enforcement of a tax over time. As such,
certain aspects of Paine’s proposal are inevitably unclear relative to 21st century tax policies. In
this section, we discuss three of the primary ambiguities in Paine’s tax design that are most
consequential for tax assessment were his plan to be adopted.
First, the liability for Paine’s tax proposal is entirely based on the yearly value of an
estate, but it is unclear whether these values are imputed by the tax collector based on market
conditions at the time, such as a five percent rate of return per year, or if there would need to be
some sort of cash flow that was tracked by the taxpayer, a third party withholding agent, or the
tax authority.
To illustrate the significance of this question, compare two billionaires, each with one
billion dollars’ worth of commercial real estate as determined by its current exchange value.
Although both are owners of the same amount of land, Owner A has a 100% occupancy rate
while Owner B has a 0% occupancy rate. Under Paine’s proposal, would the yearly value be the
same for the two landowners, as both are equivalent billionaires from a net worth standpoint, or
would only the owner of the occupied land pay tax? This question also has implications for the
tax treatment of property that appreciates in value. Would the new appreciation appear as part of
the yearly value of the property and thus potentially be subject to a 100% marginal rate, or would
the appreciation simply appear in the following tax year’s yearly value, so that the yield of which
would be subject to the tax?
If we assume some type of cash flow requirement, then the tax liability for the
unoccupied land yielding no annual flow of “produce” would be zero. The appreciation in value
would also escape tax in the year of appreciation, though the future produce would still be taxed.

68

Lianna Brinded, The 14 Aristocrats Who Are Richer Than the Queen, INSIDER (Jan. 6, 2017, 2:00 AM),
https://www.insider.com/sunday-times-rich-list-2016-the-aristocrats-that-are-richer-than-the-queen-2017-1#14-theduke-of-northumberland-1.
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If we interpret Paine’s proposal based on his explicitly stated goal of ending aristocracy and
creating a certain tier of wealth to be a prohibitable luxury, then the two billionaires would be
subject to the same amount of tax and appreciation would also count as a form of produce. In the
estimates provided in Part II.C, we impute the yearly value of estates regardless of realization.
This is most consistent with the stated goals of Paine’s tax proposal. One aspect of Paine’s
objection to the large estates of his era is that they were not used productively, so it is unlikely
that his proposal would give preferential tax treatment to aristocrats who choose to keep land
fallow or vacant.69
The question of imputed annual value also has implications for determining under what
conditions would the corpus of a billionaire’s estate be taxed, beyond the one hundred percent
tax on produce from the estate. Should annual yearly value be based on imputed rate of return
regardless of cash flow, and should the actual rate of return be below the value imputed by tax
authorities, then the cost of owning certain property would exceed its yearly value. For example,
the billionaire whose entire holding of commercial real estate had no tenants and who also had
no appreciation in value, would see a tax liability that reduced their net worth if returns were
imputed. This would create an even stronger incentive for estates to be broken up by their own
owners and is consistent with Paine’s stated goals for the tax.
A second fundamental question pertains to the treatment of debt under Paine’s proposal.
To return to our two hypothetical billionaires, imagine that they continue to own equal plots of
land, but one has borrowed against their land at its entire value so that his net worth would be
zero although he still holds title to the land, while the other has no debt at all. Would this debt be
factored into the “yearly value” for determining liability of the tax? One possibility is that debt
would only be considered to the extent interest payments were made on the debt in a given year
such that they would reduce the “yearly value” of the estate by the amount of interest paid. Paine
is explicit, however, that deductions for land tax be allowed yet makes no mention of deductions
for interest payments. This choice implies interest would not be deductible. The option to borrow
against one’s estate is also emblematic of the very luxuries provided by wealth that those without
large estates do not enjoy, further implying that debt is to be disregarded for purposes of
determining yearly value. If Paine’s primary ambition is to tax the luxuries attendant to wealth,
then allowing borrowing to reduce tax liabilities of the aristocracy would directly undermine his
goals.70 We must concede, however, that Paine simply does not address this issue explicitly and
so it remains up for interpretation.71
The final ambiguity we discuss in this section applies to international tax planning
opportunities under Paine’s tax. No tax is without avoidance opportunities and Paine’s proposal

69

See FONER, supra note 10, at 439 ([The wealth consolidation that results from primogeniture] “occasions a waste
of national property. A considerable part of the land of the country is rendered unproductive, by the great extent of
parks and chases which this law serves to keep up, and this at a time when the annual production of grain is not
equal to the national consumption.”). Adam Smith also observed this pattern as a reason to critique the economic
incentives created by the entail. See CORNISH, supra note 42, at 168.
70
This tax outcome would also reflect the commonly held belief in this era that debt was a serious moral failing. See
BRUCE MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2009).
71
It is also interesting to contrast the high level of detail in Paine’s proposal for a social safety net to the relative
simplicity of his tax proposal on wealth. This distinction may reflect his own personal experience, as Paine was not
himself a wealthy man, and so knew far less about the capital structure of landed estates than he did about the
realities of poverty.
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is no exception. We note this ambiguity since cross-border tax issues are one of the most
common compliance challenges raised in debates over taxing wealth.72 Under Paine’s proposal,
it is unclear whether taxpayers’ decision to expatriate themselves or their assets would be
effective in avoiding Paine’s tax. Again, looking to Paine’s stated priorities in designing his tax
can provide greater clarity. To the extent the produce of one’s wealth is under the dominion of
the taxpayer, then the taxpayer is surely enjoying the luxury of their wealth. Hence, Paine’s tax
should apply regardless of whether the wealth is held overseas.

C. Estimate of Paine's Tax in Contemporary U.S.
Table 2 summarizes the Paine tax brackets translated into 2020 U.S. dollars.73 Column 1
reiterates the marginal tax rates associated with the Paine plan, from 1.25 to 100%. Column 2
updates Paine’s tax brackets by converting them from 1792 pounds to 2020 dollars. Column 3
notes the amount of taxes a taxpayer would owe at the top of the bracket, and column 4 reports
their remaining revenue. Column 5 provides a rough estimate of the size of estate likely to
produce the relevant level of revenue, assuming a 5% rate of return.74

72

See, e.g., OECD, THE ROLE AND DESIGN OF NET WEALTH TAXES IN THE OECD, CHAPTER 4: NET WEALTH TAX
DESIGN ISSUES (2018).
73
We account for inflation between 1792 and 2020 using income relative to per capita GDP; this measure allows
for a comparison of relative economic status or position within the income distribution. Using this measure, £1 in
1792 is equal to £1577 in 2020. Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.K. Pound Amount, 1270 to
Present, https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ukcompare/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2022). We then converted
to dollars at a rate of £1 = $1.37; thus £1 in 1792 is equal to $2,160.49 in 2020. An alternative approach uses
personal income per capita rather than GDP per capita and produces similar results. According to Lindert infra
note 155, income per capita in Britain in 1801 was £22.33; the Federal Reserve estimates U.S. personal income per
capita in 2020 at $59,450. FED. RES. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A792RC0A052NBEA. By this measure, £1
in 1792 is equal to $2662.34 in 2020, and the top bracket of the Paine plan comes into effect for revenue from
wealth over $61.2 million, rather than $49.7 million. A full comparison of alternative measures of inflation
available from the authors on request.
74
Estimates by Saez and Zucman show that, from 1980 to 2016, real wealth of the top 0.1% has grown at 5.3% per
year. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Letter to Senator Warren (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wealth%20Tax%20Revenue%20Estimates%20by%20Saez%20and
%20Zucman%20-%20Feb%2024%2020211.pdf. Batchelder also assumes a 5% rate of return for her hypothetical
taxpayer. Batchelder infra note 103 at 82, fn.12. This is more conservative than Forbes, which estimates a 7% rate
per year. Saez & Zucman, supra note 73. Once a rate of return is agreed upon, any amount of wealth can be re-stated
in terms of its annual value.
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Table 2: Paine’s Wealth Tax in the 21st Century

Marginal
Rate
(%)
0
1.25
2.5
3.75
5
7.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100

Bracket
(Revenue from
Wealth)
(2020 $)
Up to $108,025
Up to $1,080,245
$2,160,490
$4,320,980
$6,481,470
$8,641,960
$10,802,450
$12,962,940
$15,123,430
$17,283,920
$19,444,410
$21,604,900
$23,765,390
$25,925,880
$28,086,370
$30,246,860
$32,407,350
$34,567,840
$36,728,330
$38,888,820
$41,049,310
$43,209,800
$45,370,290
$47,530,780
$49,691,270

Tax Paid
(2020 $)
$0
$13,503
$40,617
$121,420
$229,444
$391,481
$608,178
$932,035
$1,364,133
$1,904,688
$2,553,051
$3,307,710
$4,173,202
$5,143,695
$6,223,940
$7,413,505
$8,711,096
$10,114,550
$11,624,516
$13,245,532
$14,974,788
$16,812,933
$18,756,078
$20,808,975
$22,967,305

Post Tax
Revenue from
Wealth
(2020 $)
$108,025
$1,066,742
$2,119,873
$4,199,560
$6,252,026
$8,250,479
$10,194,272
$12,030,905
$13,759,297
$15,379,232
$16,891,359
$18,297,190
$19,592,188
$20,782,185
$21,862,430
$22,833,355
$23,696,254
$24,453,290
$25,103,814
$25,643,288
$26,074,522
$26,396,867
$26,614,212
$26,721,805
$26,723,965

Approximate Estate
Size
(2020 $, in millions)
$2
$22
$43
$86
$130
$173
$216
$259
$302
$346
$389
$432
$475
$519
$562
$605
$648
$691
$735
$778
$821
$864
$907
$951
$994

In contemporary dollars, the lowest taxes of the Paine plan are applied to estates
producing an income above $108,025. If wealth produces a 5% annual rate of return, that estate
would be worth about $2.2 million. The owner of this estate would pay a 1.25% tax on income
above $108,025, for a maximum of $13,503 in tax liability in that bracket. At the other end of the
spectrum, the 100% bracket applies to revenue from wealth totaling about $49.7 million, a level
of income one would expect from an estate worth $994 million. Roughly speaking, then, Paine’s
100% tax applies to billionaires.
The after-tax return to wealth declines substantially before the 100% bracket, of course.
The last approximately $100 million in wealth before reaching a billion would result in an
increase to after-tax income of only about $100,000. The last $40 million of a billionaire’s
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wealth would increase their after-tax income by about $2,000. The maximum after-tax revenue
anyone could earn from wealth under the Paine 2021 plan would be $26.7 million (Figure 2).

Figure 2: The Declining Returns to Wealth Under Updated Paine Tax Plan
Because the Paine tax proposal puts a cap on the returns to wealth, the average tax rate,
calculated by dividing the amount paid in tax by the total size of the estate, depends upon the
taxpayer’s annual rate of return. From 1980 to 2016, real wealth of the top 0.1% has grown at
5.3% per year.75 Under Paine’s tax proposal, a hypothetical billionaire who experienced a 5%
annual return on their estate of 2 billion dollars would have a revenue of $100 million, $73.3
million over the revenue maximum; this billionaire would therefore owe $73.3 million in taxes,
an average tax rate of 3.5%, a tax rate similar to contemporary wealth tax proposals.
However, though real wealth at the top has grown on average at about five percent,76
individual households experience higher or lower rates of return from year to year. For example,
the ten richest billionaires in the world doubled their wealth over the first 21 months of the

75

Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Letter to Senator Warren (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wealth%20Tax%20Revenue%20Estimates%20by%20Saez%20and
%20Zucman%20-%20Feb%2024%2020211.pdf. Batchelder also assumes a 5% rate of return for her hypothetical
taxpayer. Batchelder, infra note 103 at 82 fn.12. This is more conservative than Forbes, which estimates a 7% rate
per year. Saez & Zucman, supra note 73. Once a rate of return is agreed upon, any amount of wealth can be re-stated
in terms of its annual value.
76
Saez & Zucman, supra note 73.
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COVID-19 pandemic.77 Under the Paine proposal, the maximum revenue cap would continue to
apply; each U.S. billionaire would be able to receive up to $26,723,965 in after-tax returns. Any
estate growth beyond this would be paid to the federal government in taxes, essentially setting a
ceiling on current billionaires’ levels of wealth.
Table 3 estimates the tax liability that would have been imposed on contemporary
billionaires using our 2020 tax rate schedule.78 U.S. billionaire estate sizes are drawn from the
2020 and 2021 Forbes World’s Billionaires Lists.79 Because we are estimating the tax liability of
U.S. taxpayers, we only estimate for U.S. billionaires.80 Our table estimates the impact on the top
ten U.S. billionaires on the Forbes list in 2021.
Table 3: Paine’s Tax Applied to US Billionaires in Tax Year 2021
Name

Jeff Bezos
Elon Musk
Bill Gates
Mark
Zuckerberg

Wealth in
202081
(billions)

Wealth in 2021
(billions)

120.9183
26.32
104.86
58.53

177
151
124
97

Tax82
(billions)

Wealth in 2021 Average tax
(post-Paine
rate on
wealth tax,
Wealth (%)
billions)
56
32%
120.94
125
83%
26.35
19
15%
104.89
38
40%
58.56

77

This increase is driven to a substantial degree by Elon Musk’s fortune, which was ten times larger in November
2021 than it was in March of 2020, but all of these billionaires saw double-digit annualized growth. One of the
billionaires included in this statistic is not an American and therefore is excluded from the analysis that follows.
Max Lawson & Didier Jacobs, Inequality Kills: Methodology Note, OXFAM (Jan. 2022),
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621341/tb-inequality-kills-methodology-note170122-en.pdf?sequence=24.
78
The annual revenue procedure issued by the IRS to adjust brackets for inflation is generally issued at the end of
the year preceding the year in which tax liability is assessed. For example, Rev. Proc. 2020-45 was issued in Oct.
2020 to specify the new brackets that were to be used in tax year 2021. Hence, we use our 2020 inflation
adjustments to Paine’s 1792 rate schedule for determining tax liabilities imposed on 2021 estate sizes.
79
Kerry A. Dolan, Jennifer Wang & Chase Peterson-Withorn, eds., Forbes World’s Billionaires List: The Richest in
2021, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
80
Paine did not specify whether foreign assets would be excluded from the tax, nor whether foreign taxpayers with
domestic assets would be included in the tax, so our estimates reflect our assumption that global wealth be included.
Foreign citizens are excluded from our analysis of due to data limitations related to determining portion of net worth
attributed to U.S. assets in the Forbes list.
81
These figures are adjusted for inflation; all dollar figures in Table 3 are in 2021 dollars.
82
This is the tax liability absent any behavioral changes. As noted earlier, Paine’s tax is intended to provoke
behavioral changes. In any case, a 100 percent compliance rate is unlikely; Saez & Zucman, supra note 74, assume a
15% noncompliance rate. For more details on planning techniques that might be used to avoid a wealth tax, see
Jason Oh & Eric Zolt, Wealth Tax Design: Lessons from Estate Tax Avoidance, 74 TAX L. REV. 175 (2021).
83
The estimates of billionaire wealth are not generally provided below the billion or hundred million level; the
apparent precision here is an artefact of the inflation adjustment. While it may not provide a perfectly accurate
estimate of the wealth of each household, we present the wealth estimates to two decimal places so that the increase
in wealth post-tax is visible; otherwise, each household’s increase in wealth of $26.7 million disappears in the
rounding.
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Warren
Buffett
Larry Ellison
Larry Page
Sergey Brin
Steve
Ballmer
Alice Walton

72.23
63.13
54.46
52.54
56.39
58.21

THE COMMON SENSE OF A WEALTH TAX

96

24

93
91.5
89
68.7

30
37
36
12

63.16
54.49
52.56

61.8

4

58.23

72.25

56.42

25%
32%
40%
41%
18%
6%

As Table 3 makes clear, the average rate of wealth taxation responds to the household’s
increase in estate size over the year. Billionaires whose wealth grew less see a lower average tax
rate as a share of their overall wealth. Due to Paine’s graduated rate schedule, Paine’s proposal
also allows for increasing wealth over time, at a maximum rate equal to $26.7 million a year.
Over ten years, those in the top Paine bracket would see their real wealth increase by one quarter
of a billion dollars, or a more than one billion dollar increase in real wealth over 40 years. The
Paine plan constrains but does not prevent the accumulation of wealth, even for the very
wealthiest.

Part III: 21st Century Analogs to the Paine Tax
Although Paine’s wealth tax proposal was not adopted during his lifetime, his ideas
remain relevant to the tax policy debates of today. Indeed, Paine’s tax policy priorities speak
directly to the 21st century challenges of the rise of oligarchic wealth concentration and the
deteriorating conditions of American democracy. Through the lens of Paine’s core wealth tax
principles, this Part discusses three contemporary proposals to address current levels of wealth
inequality. Although each proposal we discuss has elements that distinguish it from Paine’s
proposal, all three share the following features. First, they all endeavor to tax wealth. Second,
they all attend to the civic implications of tax policy. And third, they target a specific political
group for tax liability. By contrasting these proposals with Paine’s initial 18th Century wealth
tax, we also see one clear difference: Paine’s willingness to deem certain levels of wealth
concentration as “prohibitable luxuries,” with a top marginal rate of 100%. After proceeding
through the details of each proposal, this Part concludes with a table summarizing the salient
features of the contrasting tax policies of common purpose.

A. Achieving Paine’s Ambitions Through a Property Tax Regime
Some features of Paine’s wealth tax design specifications closely parallel 21st century
wealth tax proposals. For the sake of clarity, this section will focus on the elements of Senator
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Elizabeth Warren’s Ultra-Millionaire’s Tax (“UMT”),84 although there are a variety of proposals
by both scholars and politicians who have sought to expand the federal tax system in the US to
include wealth as a taxable base.85
The taxable base in Warren’s UMT endeavors to capture all property interests of the
taxpayer, referred to in campaign materials as the taxpayer’s “net worth” and in the introduced
legislation as “net value of all taxable assets.”86 This taxable base is further elaborated to
encompasses “all property of the taxpayer… real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever
situated, reduced by any debts… owed by the taxpayer.”87 Additional anti-abuse rules in the
legislation include interests in grantor trusts and certain gifts within the taxable base.88
While Paine’s taxable base is only the annual proceeds from wealth rather than the wealth
itself, his definition of underlying wealth that triggers tax liability is similarly broad to Warren’s
UMT. Paine proposes to tax “all estates of the clear yearly value of £50, after deducting the land
tax, and up.”89 Since Paine chooses not to provide his own definition of the term “estate” used in
Rights of Man, his omission suggests he is relying on a common understanding of the term at the
time. According to Black’s Legal Dictionary, the term “estate” has been used since at least the
15th century to refer to an individual’s property interests, including land but not exclusively
land.90 Notably, Paine did not use the term “landed estate,” a term commonly used in the late 18th
Century to describe an estate comprised solely of land.91 Paine also does not use limiting terms
like “ancestral estate” or “entail” that would have specified a narrowing of his tax base to certain
categories of inherited or inheritable property.
The UMT bracket structure makes plain the political targets of Warren’s proposed wealth
tax regime. No household with less than $50 million in assets would be liable for remitting UMT

84

See The Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021, S. 510, 117th Cong. (2021) (text of the legislation); Elizabeth Warren,
Pramila Jayapal & Brendan Boyle, Summary: Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021, ELIZABETH WARREN (Mar. 1,
2021), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Summary%20%20Ultra%20Millionaire%20Tax%20Act%20of%202021%20(1)_.pdf (bill summary); Ultra-Millionaire Tax,
WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (last visited Sept. 13, 2021,1:14 PM)
(campaign related materials when first proposed as a candidate for President of the United States).
85
See, e.g., Brian Galle, David Gamage, Emmanuel Saez & Darien Shanske,The California Tax on Extreme Wealth:
Revenue, Economic, and Constitutional Analysis (Sept. 16, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3924524; Senator Bernie Sanders’ Wealth Tax, PENN
WHARTON BUDGET MODEL (Jan. 23, 2020), https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/estimates/2020/1/23/senatorbernie-sanders-wealth-tax; JEREMY BEARER-FRIEND, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE, RESTORING DEMOCRACY
THROUGH TAX POLICY 10–12 (2018).
86
The Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021, S. 510, 117th Cong., § 2902 (2021). Campaign materials specify: “All
household assets held anywhere in the world will be included in the net worth measurement, including residences,
closely held businesses, assets held in trust, retirement assets, assets held by minor children, and personal property
with a value of $50,000 or more.” Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS,
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (last visited Sept. 13, 2021,1:14 PM).
87
The Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021, S. 510, 117th Cong., § 2902(a) (2021).
88
The Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021, S. 510, 117th Cong., § 2902(c)(2)-(3) (2021).
89
Paine, Table 1, p.497.
90
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
91
Id. Paine is also clearly aware of land taxes at the time since he proposes allowing for land tax deductions, yet he
does not propose using the same tax base as the land tax.
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taxes. This forms a “zero bracket” for the vast majority of American households.92 The next
bracket applies a 2% tax on households with a net value of assets between $50 million and one
$1 billion.93 The top bracket would then apply an additional 1% on the portion of annual net
value of assets that exceeds $1 billion, for a top rate of 3%.94 This bracket structure is estimated
to apply to only 75,000 households in the US.95
Warren’s UMT treats the individual as the taxable unit for determining value of net
assets, with the additional specification that “individuals who are married will be treated as one
applicable taxpayer.”96 Hence, a taxpayer who owns $100 million in assets is not able to avoid
the UMT by marrying someone with $0 in assets.97 This approach is similar to Paine’s proposal
due to the operation of property rules at the time of his publication. Although not explicitly noted
by Paine, the law of “coverture” would subsume a married woman’s property rights into the
rights of her husband.98
Like Paine’s proposed wealth tax, the UMT would also require annual assessment and
remittance. To allay criticisms about liquidity concerns, the UMT includes an option to defer
payment up to five years, with interest applied to the deferred liability.99
The motivating principles for Warren’s UMT also echo Paine. As Warren explains in her
public preamble to the UMT, “For too long, the ultra-rich… have used their influence to rig the
system in their favor – corroding our democracy….” This specific concern with the outsize
political influence of billionaires then justifies a tax on their wealth. The remedy to a political
problem wherein some members of the polity have more influence than others is not purely a
matter of lobbying reform or expanding voting rights, but a matter of tax policy generally and a
tax on wealth specifically.
The UMT is also designed based on concerns with heirs who inherit wealth. In the
example provided to illustrate the UMT, Warren explains, “Consider two people: an heir with
$500 million in yachts, jewelry, and fine art, and a teacher with no savings in the bank. If both
the heir and the teacher bring home $50,000 in labor income next year, they would pay the same

92

The Warren Office estimates that 99.95% of households in the US would not be subject to the UMT. Elizabeth
Warren, Pramila Jayapal & Brendan Boyle, Summary: Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021, ELIZABETH WARREN
(Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Summary%20%20Ultra%20Millionaire%20Tax%20Act%20of%202021%20(1)_.pdf.
93
The Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021, S. 510, 117th Cong., § 2901(b) (2021).
94
Id. The additional 1% becomes an additional 4% in the event the U.S. adopts universal health insurance.
95
Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (last visited
Sept. 13, 2021,1:14 PM).
96
The Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021, S. 510, 117th Cong., § 2902(c)(2) (2021).
97
This is not to say other avoidance strategies are not possible. A married couple with $100 million in assets could
divorce and evenly split their assets 50/50, so that neither would be subject to the UMT.
98
The primary exception to this is the use of a “separate estate trust.” See Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the
End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J. L. & FEM. 165 (2014). In the
event of such a trust arrangement, Paine’s rate schedule would need to be applied to each spouse.
99
Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (last visited
Sept. 13, 2021,1:14 PM).
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amount in federal taxes, despite their vastly different circumstances.”100 The constituencies
targeted by the tax are heirs to fortunes, who are held in contrast to public servants who earn a
living through wages.
Both Paine and Warren also share a concern with a taxpayer’s ‘ability to pay’ in which
taxes are shouldered by those with the means to. Paine states a priority of “removing the burden
to where it can best be borne” and Warren notes, “A family’s wealth is an important measure…
of its ability to pay taxes.”101 This concern is then expressed through the progressive rate
structures of both tax proposals.
Despite their many similarities, there are distinguishing features between Paine’s
proposal and Warren’s. First, Paine would substitute a commutation tax with his wealth tax, and
so the baseline for evaluating his proposal is thus the limitations of the commutation tax. His
revenue targets and distributional concerns are in comparison to commutation. By contrast, the
UMT is not proposed as a substitute for the federal income tax regime or other federal taxes,
though it does seek to fill gaps of where the income tax is no longer effective.102 The UMT is an
additional tax liability on ultra-millionaires rather than a shift from one base to another.
The Paine and Warren proposals also have distinct implications for the ability of
billionaires to acquire new wealth. Under the Paine proposal, a billionaire could not accrue any
wealth above approximately $27 million in a single year, because this excess amount would be
taxed at 100%. Under Warren’s UMT, a billionaire’s whose return on investment exceeded her
top rate of 3% would get to keep such accession, less potential income tax liability. In effect, the
Warren proposal does not set a ceiling for wealth accession by billionaires, while the Paine
proposal essentially caps current levels of wealth accumulation for anyone above the $994
million threshold.

B. Achieving Paine’s Ambitions Through a Transfer Tax Regime
While Warren’s UMT proposes to tax wealth through a new federal property tax regime,
others have sought to address extraordinary wealth concentration by reforming the transfer tax
system. In this section, we discuss efforts to reform the estate and gift tax in order to achieve
similar ambitions to Paine. For purposes of clarity, we focus on Professor Lily Batchelder’s
proposal to tax wealth through a revised transfer tax regime.103 Batchelder’s proposal is

100

Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (last visited
Sept. 13, 2021,1:14 PM).
101
Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (last visited
Sept. 13, 2021,1:14 PM).
102
Warren regularly cites the current average tax rate on households relative to their wealth, pointing to the lower
average rates on billionaires. According to her, “Increasing income taxes won’t address this problem.” UltraMillionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (last visited Sept.
13, 2021,1:14 PM).
103
Lily L. Batchelder, Leveling the Playing Field Between Inherited Income and Income from Work through an
Inheritance Tax, in TACKLING THE TAX CODE (Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh eds., 2020),
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especially salient because she is now Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury
Department.104
Professor Batchelder proposes a shift from taxing decedents to taxing heirs.105 Although
Batchelder explicitly describes her proposal as a shift away from transfer taxes towards income
taxes, the proposal includes specific rules for inheritances that do not extend to other categories
of income, such as an exemption amount schedule for inheritances and a constructive realization
rule that applies to inheritances but not other appreciated assets.106 The proposal also triggers tax
liability only upon transfer. This article does not contend that Batchelder is inaccurate in
describing her proposal as integrating inheritance taxes within the income tax relative to the
current law baseline in the US, but for our purposes of contrasting Paine’s approach with
Batchelder’s, transfer taxes are the most relevant baseline.107
Batchelder shares many of her policy motivations with Paine. In concluding her argument
for the adoption of a new tax on inheritances, she states that “we should recommit to a vision of
America as a land of opportunity where one’s financial success depends relatively little on the
circumstances of one’s birth. A first step is to start taxing extraordinarily large inheritances the
same way we tax good old hard work.”108 Here she sees equality of opportunity as specifically
constrained by inherited wealth, something that Paine also sought to use tax policy to alter. And
she not only connects this to an intellectual legacy of egalitarianism, but also political power,
invoking New Dealer FDR. As noted by Batchelder, “President Franklin Delano Roosevelt once
said, ‘Inherited economic power is as inconsistent with the ideals of this generation as inherited
political power was inconsistent with the ideals of the generation which established our
government’. The same could be said today.”109 Batchelder’s proposal recognizes the political
power that comes with wealth, and the power that can be inherited through wealth, and she has
proposed a tax policy to address this fundamentally democratic concern.110
To be sure, Batchelder includes a number of additional rationales for shifting to an
inheritance tax model, invoking the tax policy triumvirate of fairness, efficiency, and
administrability for evaluating tax policy.111 Unlike Paine, she is also explicit about the racial

https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/leveling_the_playing_field_between_inherited_income_and_income_from_
work_through_an_inheritance_tax. Because the proposal was made in her capacity as a law professor at NYU and
prior to her confirmation in the US Senate, Batchelder is not referred to by her Treasury title.
104
Roll Call Vote 117th Congress – 1st Session: Vote Summary, UNITED STATES SENATE (Sept. 22, 2021, 2:50 PM),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1171/vote_117_1_00372.htm.
105
Batchelder, supra note 102.
106
“Under the proposal, there would no longer be any separate wealth transfer tax system; the estate, gift, and GST
taxes would be repealed. Instead, taxation of inheritances would be integrated into the income and payroll taxes.”
Batchelder, supra note 102, at 56.
107
Batchelder is also explicit that her proposal could be combined with a wealth tax or an accrual tax. Batchelder,
supra note 102, at 71 (“the proposal offered here is a complement rather than a substitute for these reforms.”).
108
Batchelder, supra note 102, at 7.
109
Batchelder, supra note 102, at 87.
110
She also notes the power that comes from wealth earlier in her article. See Batchelder, supra note 102, at 50
(“People with very large estates typically have multiple reasons for saving: They might enjoy being wealthy relative
to other people, with the prestige and power that it confers while they are alive”).
111
See Batchelder, supra note 102, at 46-53.

26
© 2022 Jeremy Bearer-Friend & Vanessa Williamson
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4057585

* DRAFT * COMMENTS WELCOME *

THE COMMON SENSE OF A WEALTH TAX

equity implications of our current approach to wealth taxation, noting that inequality in
inheritances limits the upward mobility for Black men and also exacerbate downward
mobility.112 Nevertheless, these additional motivations operate in tandem with the concerns over
equality of opportunity and economic power.
Under Batchelder’s proposal, inheritances would be included in the taxable base of an
heir as part of their income. This is a shift from our current estate and gift tax regime, where
taxes are assessed on the decedent or donor. Hence, “the focal point for taxation would shift from
the amount transferred to the amount heirs receive.”113 The gross estate would be defined
similarly to Paine in that the estate would include the value “of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated” but a greater number of deductions are allowed relative
to Paine’s limitation on land tax as the exclusive deduction.114 Most importantly, Paine proposes
to tax the produce from an estate, while Batchelder would tax the entire value of the estate.
Batchelder’s proposed bracket structure is simply the current tax rates already applied to
income under our federal income tax and payroll taxes. This ranges from 10% to 37% under
2021 federal income tax rates plus up to 15.3% under our payroll taxes.115 However, because of
the partial deductibility of payroll taxes, Batchelder calculates a top marginal rate of 49.5%.116
Batchelder notes that her proposal “can be scaled to different revenue targets”117 with the rate
structure of course determining the amount of tax revenue raised. In order to explain the design
features as applied to a hypothetical taxpayer, she chooses an exemption amount of $2.5 million,
but this is also adjustable based on revenue targets.118
Unlike Paine’s annual assessments, Batchelder’s inheritance tax proposal would only
trigger tax liability in years where inheritances are received by the taxpayer. The tax liability
would not recur in future years. To contrast with Paine’s proposal, consider a taxpayer who
inherits $10 billion worth of land. Under the Batchelder proposal, federal income tax rates would
apply to that transfer in the year received, less the liquid asset cushion119 on $500k, to be paid by
the recipient of the land.120 Under Paine’s proposal, tax liability would be assessed annually,
including year of receipt, but only on the produce of the land received. In both proposals, the
taxable amount would be determined by aggregating all assets of the taxholder, rather than

112

Batchelder, supra note 102, at 47. This is not to say that Paine was unconcerned with racial inequality generally,
just that he is not explicit about race in the context of his wealth tax proposal in the second volume of Rights of Man.
For an elaboration on the potential implications of his proposal for abolition, see supra Part I.
113
Batchelder, supra note 102, at 56.
114
IRC §2031 defines “gross estate”. For an itemized list of the deductions allowed for determining “taxable estate,”
see IRS Form 1041, lines 10 through 21, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1041.pdf.
115
IRC §1 for income tax rate schedule. IRC §1401(a)-(b) for SECA rate.
116
Batchelder, supra note 102, at 81 n.14.
117
Batchelder, supra note 102, at 56.
118
Alternative specifications are 500k lifetime exemption and 1 million lifetime exemption.
119
Batchelder, supra note 102, at 58.
120
This hypothetical assumes there are no built-in gains at the time of the transfer. The Batchelder proposal views
transfers as constructive realizations for which income tax would also be paid by the grantor. Batchelder 57.

27
© 2022 Jeremy Bearer-Friend & Vanessa Williamson
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4057585

* DRAFT * COMMENTS WELCOME *

THE COMMON SENSE OF A WEALTH TAX

looking at a single asset or transfer. Under both the Paine and Batchelder proposal, the new tax
regime would be effective immediately.121
The Batchelder proposal is attentive to the unique politics of family-owned businesses
and primary residences, providing additional carveouts for this political constituency. “The third
feature of the proposal would address the politically sensitive issue of family-owned businesses
and primary residences through a special provision… To address these concerns, the proposal
would allow heirs to indefinitely defer the tax they owe on taxable inheritances to the extent it
exceeds the liquid assets they inherit, minus a cushion of $500,000.”122 The deferral period
would still require interest paid on the amount of unpaid tax liability.123 These provisions seem
partially motivated by the symbolic features of tax policy, wherein proposals are understood as
expressions of political values.
The share of taxpayers impacted by the proposed change is generally narrow relative to the
overall population of US taxpayers. Based on lifetime exemption amounts of $2.5 million, $1
million, and $500,000, the proposal would impact only the top 0.02 percent, 0.08 percent, and
0.18 percent of households in a given year.124 Batchelder notes that even if the calculation were
limited to those receiving inheritances, the proportion is below 10% for all exemption
amounts.125

C. Achieving Paine’s Ambitions Through an Income Tax Regime
Lastly, Paine’s concern with taxing “overgrown estates” aligns with contemporary
reforms to the federal income tax. Specifically, proposals to adjust income tax treatment for
wealth concentration, so that billionaires are no longer able to avoid annual tax liability on
appreciated assets. Although our federal income tax nominally taxes all new accessions to wealth
each year, the realization requirement allows most billionaires to avoid tax on their annual gains.
For the sake of clarity, this section will focus on the elements of Senator Ron Wyden’s
Billionaire’s Income Tax (“BIT”).126
The Wyden tax proposal is principally motivated by current inequities in the income tax
system. The BIT would level the tax liability faced by wage earners and those with passive
sources of investment income. According to Wyden, “There are two tax codes in America. The
first is mandatory for workers who pay taxes out of every pay check. The second is voluntary for
billionaires who defer paying taxes for years, if not indefinitely.”127 Wyden is concerned that
“middle-class families who earn their incomes from wages and salaries may face higher average

121

Batchelder, supra note 102, at 61 (“Finally, the proposal would not be phased in, but would be effective
immediately.”).
122
Batchelder, supra note 102, at 58.
123
Batchelder, supra note 102, at 58.
124
See Batchelder, supra note 102, at 71. See also Batchelder, supra note 102, at 83, fn 34.
125
Estimates were nor provided based on proportion of households over their entire lifecycle.
126
Billionaire’s Income Tax, https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Billionaires%20Income%20Tax.pdf.
127
Wyden Unveils Billionaires Income Tax, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/wyden-unveils-billionaires-income-tax.
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tax rates than billionaires”128 and his BIT seeks to end this inequality. To do so means changing
the tax treatment of accrued wealth.
Wyden’s taxable base is the net accrual of new wealth in a tax year, consistent with the
general principles of an income tax that tax accessions to new wealth rather than total wealth.
Under Wyden’s plan, “tradable assets (assets like stocks that are easily valued on an annual
basis) owned by billionaires will be marked to market each year,” meaning that gains will be
taxed and losses will be deducted in each year rather than upon realization.129 His plan also
includes inheritances in the taxable base of the donor: “Gifts, bequests, and transfers in trust by
an applicable taxpayer are generally treated as an applicable transfer, requiring recognition of
gain or loss.”130 This is a departure from the current income tax treatment of transfers. It is also
clearly distinct from Paine’s proposal, which sought to incentive transfers to heirs by reducing
tax liability for estates that diminished in size through such transfers.
In Wyden’s proposed bracket structure, “only taxpayers with more than $100 million in
annual income or more than $1 billion in assets for three consecutive years would be covered by
the proposal.”131 Additional accommodations are made for those with concentrated holdings in a
single company. Such taxpayers may “elect to treat up to $1 billion of tradable stock in a single
corporation as a nontradable asset” which permits deferral of tax liability with a modest interest
rate.132 Due to the narrow requirements for the BIT, only 700 household would face a new tax
liability under the proposal.133
Like Paine’s proposal, the timing of the BIT is annual taxation. Enactment of the BIT
would mean “a taxable event occurs at the close of each taxable year that an applicable taxpayer
holds a tradable covered asset, and gain or loss will be taken into account in the taxable year in
which the taxable event occurs as though the tradable covered asset had been sold for its fair

128

Billionaires Income Tax – One Pager, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Billionaires%20Income%20Tax%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf.
129
An appealing feature of mark to market is that inflation of value of an asset for purposes of claiming losses then
makes one more susceptible to taxable gains in future years, so it is viewed as somewhat self-correcting.
130
Billionaires Income Tax – Section-By-Section Summary, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Billionaires%20Income%20Tax%20-%20Section-by-Section.pdf, at
4.
131
Billionaires Income Tax – One Pager, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Billionaires%20Income%20Tax%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf.
132
Billionaires Income Tax – One Pager, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Billionaires%20Income%20Tax%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf. (“The
deferral recapture amount is calculated by allocating an equal amount of gain to each year in the holding period,
determining how much tax would have been owed on the gain in each year, and assessing interest on unpaid tax for
the time the tax was deferred. The interest rate used is the short-term federal rate plus one percentage point, and no
interest accrues prior to the date of enactment of the proposal or the first tax year the individual is subject to the
Billionaires Income Tax, whichever is later.”).
133
Billionaires Income Tax – One Pager, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Billionaires%20Income%20Tax%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf.
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market value.”134 Similar to the Batchelder proposal, the rate of the tax is set by current income
tax rates.
Table 4. Wealth Tax Design Specifications
Paine Proposal

UltraMillionaire’s
Tax

Inheritance
Tax

Billionaire’s
Income Tax

Taxable Base

Yearly Value

Net Worth

Inheritance

Income

Preferential
Rate for
Couples

N/A135

No

Yes

No136

Annual
Assessment

Yes

Yes

No, only at
transfer

Yes

Zero Bracket

Estates below
$2.2 million per
year137

Net worth
below $50
million

Estates below
$2.5 million138

Assets below
$1 billion or
annual income
below $100
million

Top Marginal
Rate

100%

6%139

49.5%140

40.8%141

134

Billionaires Income Tax – Section-By-Section Summary, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Billionaires%20Income%20Tax%20-%20Section-by-Section.pdf, at
1.
135
Until the late 19th Century, married women in Britain did not have independent property rights. See generally,
EILEEN SPRING, LAW, LAND & FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN ENGLAND (1993) (describing the law of
coverture and other limitations on the property rights of women).
136
§495 Billionaires Income Tax, https://www.finance.senate.gov/download/billionaires-income-tax-legislative-text.
137
The figure is drawn from our calculations in Table 2 in supra Part II.C.
138
Batchelder provides estimates for three different exemption amounts, but focuses her discussion on the $2.5
million exemption amount. The figure presented here also includes her retention of the $15,000 annual exclusion
under current law.
139
This top rate applies in years where there is also a national, comprehensive health insurance program that bans
duplicative private insurance. If such conditions are not present, then the top marginal rate is 3%. The UltraMillionaire Tax Act of 2021, S. 510, 117th Cong., § 2901(b)(2) (2021).
140
This percentage includes the top income tax rate (currently 37%) and the payroll tax rate (15.3%) that Batchelder
proposes to apply to inheritances, gifts. The deductibility of certain payroll taxes under the income tax makes the
combined rate lower that 52.3%. See Batchelder supra note 103 at fn14.
141
Top income tax rate of 37% and NIIT rate of 3.8%. Most assets will likely be characterized as capital assets, with
a long term capital gain rate of 20%.
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Estimated
Revenue
Raised From
Billionaires
Over 10 Year
Window

$1.7 trillion142

$1.39 trillion143

< $337
billion144

$557 billion145

Estimated
Proportion of
Population
Subject to Top
Marginal
Rates

00.001%146

00.001%147

00.22%148

00.0004%149

PART IV: The Common Sense of Taxing Wealth
A progressive wealth tax has a uniquely American pedigree, coming directly from the
foremost popular writer of the Revolution. Paine’s plan for a wealth tax sprang from the same
source as his impassioned case for an American republic: a lifelong advocacy for freedom from
concentrated power.

142

Original calculation assuming a 5% rate of return on the wealth of U.S. billionaires. Tax brackets applied from
Table 2. Total billionaire wealth acquired from FORBES, supra note 79.
143
Saez & Zucman, supra note 73 at 4. This figure is specific to the revenue raised by the 4 percent Billionaire
Surtax included in the Warren plan (which raises $1.374 trillion) as well as the 2 percent rate on the first $950
million of these 1005 households with a 15% avoidance rate ($16.23 billion). The overall revenue expected over ten
years for the Warren plan is $3.9 trillion. Id.
144
Batchelder provides six different estimates based on different exemption levels and whether or not constructive
realization of appreciated gains is adopted. However, Batchelder does not provide a specific estimate on billionaire’s
and her top breakouts are for inheritances above $2.5 million, so this figure is substantially larger than just revenue
from billionaires. Batchelder supra note 103 at 65 Tbl. 3 & Appendix I Tbl. 3.
145
Wyden’s proposal applies to those with over a billion in assets or over a hundred million in income, so this figure
is overstated to the extent there are taxpayers who earn over $100 million in a year who are not billionaires. In
public statements, Wyden seems to assume his tax would only apply to billionaires, but due to the limited disclosure
of the Joint Committee on Taxation’s revenue estimate provided to Senator Wyden, this total revenue figure is the
only publicly available estimate. Wyden Statement on Billionaires Income Tax Score, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN.
(Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/wyden-statement-on-billionaires-income-tax-score.
146
This figure determined by number of billionaires in US divided by total population of US.
147
Both Paine and Warren limit top rates to billionaires.
148
Calculated based on Batchelder supra note 102 at Appendix Table 1 of (total lifetime inheritances above $2.5
million / total inheritances) / US population.
149
This figure is derived by taking Wyden’s estimated number of tax returns impacted (700) and dividing by the
number of tax returns filed in 2020 (157,200,000). Wyden supra note 127; IRS, DATA BOOK, 2020 2, Publ’n 55-B
(2021), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55b.pdf. Notably, Wyden’s estimate of impacted taxpayers is only 70% of
Saez & Zucman’s estimate, revealing some differences in underlying data sources, though also revealing the
common point that these proposals would impact extremely few households.
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In this Part, we summarize our new conclusions about the wealth tax debate based on a
synthesis of the four tax proposals included in our review: Paine’s tax on the yearly value of
estates, Warren’s annual tax on net worth, Batchelder’s tax on inheritances, and Wyden’s tax on
unrealized income. Viewed together, these proposals clarify the centrality of political values that
motivate tax policy, including the enduring concern with wealth as a challenge to democratic
ideals. They also illustrate the fluid relationship between income taxes and wealth taxes. Lastly,
they prompt a renewed consideration of a 100% marginal rate for certain tax bases.
Paine’s work encourages us to consider tax policy as a primarily political endeavor.
Rather than a set of technocratic nudges, Paine proposes we assess a tax’s effect in terms of the
polity, rather than simply the economy. This standard for evaluating tax policy is remarkably
prescient, as 21st Century proposals to tax wealth again invoke the challenge of concentrated
political power as a central rationale.150 And to the extent that addressing concentrated political
power is a central focus for evaluating the desirability of a tax, then tax policy that targets
concentrations of wealth becomes the ideal form of tax.151 If the corruptions of political and
economic life that Paine criticized are with us today, his proposal warrants serious consideration.
Indeed, Paine’s proposal seems especially relevant to the contemporary moment if we
directly compare the wealth distribution of late 18th Century Britain with that of the
contemporary United States. At the start of the 19th Century, the top one percent of British
households received about 15 percent of the total national income.152 In the United States today,
the amount of income received by the top 1% of earners has risen from 10 percent in 1980 to
19% in 2019.153 Similarly, the top 1% of estates in Paine’s Britain held 24% of all wealth; the top
1% of American households have 27% of total wealth.154 The level of economic inequality in the
contemporary United States is strikingly similar to the level that Paine believed corrupted British
politics. And, just as Paine claimed, extremes of wealth corrupt American elections and distort
American politics.155 The level at which Paine believed “there ought to be a limit to property, or
the accumulation of it by bequest,” is directly comparable to the highest levels of wealth in
America today.
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See supra Part III.
For an elaboration of the tax scholarship that seeks to center political power, see Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Ariel
Glogower, Ariel Jurow Kleiman & Clinton Wallace, Taxation and Law and Political Economy, 83 OHIO L. J.
(forthcoming 2022).
152
Peter H. Lindert & Jeffrey G. Williamson, American Incomes 1774-1860 No. (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper18396, 2012).
153
Business Income at the Top, AMERICAN ECON. ASS’N (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.aeaweb.org/research/chart/inequality-pass-through-incomeus#:~:text=In%201980%2C%20the%20top%201,50%20percent%20of%20earners%20combined.
154
Peter H. Lindert, Unequal English Wealth Since 1670, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1127 (1986); Alexandre Tanzi & Mike
Dorning, Top 1% of U.S. Earners Now Hold More Wealth Than All of the Middle Class, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 8,
2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-08/top-1-earners-hold-more-wealth-than-the-u-s-middleclass.
155
See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE (2012); Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman,
Congressional Officials Grant Access to Individuals Because They Have Contributed to Campaigns: A Randomized
Field Experiment, AMERICAN J. POL. SCI. (2014).
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Paine also reveals the limited analytic value of sorting tax policy by its taxable base.
While anxiety over the constitutionality of wealth taxes has swallowed much of the public
debate, the ease by which Warren’s UMT can be converted into Paine’s tax on yearly value also
demonstrates the limited substance behind the wealth tax versus income tax preoccupation.
While it is not the ambition of this article to resolve the direct tax dilemma posed by Pollock, it
should be obvious that a tax of 5% on the net worth of an individual who enjoys a 5% rate of
return on their wealth is economically equivalent to a 100% tax on a 5% rate of return of that
same individual.
Perhaps the most eye-catching aspect of Paine’s wealth tax is its top rate: 20 shillings in
the pound, or 100%. There are good reasons to take this aspect of Paine’s proposal seriously.
Properly designed to the fit the complex modern economy, there are many potential benefits to a
tax that would in essence impose a maximum revenue from personal wealth. The 100% marginal
rate is applied at levels of wealth that are indisputably luxurious: orders of magnitude beyond the
needs of any household and beyond the reward that could plausibly be credited to individual
industry. And while many of the most concerted critiques of expanding the taxable base or
increasing tax rates hinge on claims to freedom, Paine’s own proposal is specifically motivated
by the threat of oppression in a society without his tax plan. To be free, for Paine, one must be
free to participate in representative government. “Overgrown influence” corrupts elections, Paine
rightly informs us; because extremes of wealth are extremes of power, they erode republican
government and leave the citizenry less free.
To be clear, as we outline in Table 3, Paine’s 100% marginal rate on the revenue from
wealth does not tax 100% of wealth. Paine’s tax would at its maximum apply a rate nearly equal
to wealth’s rate of return, which has been, on average, about 5% in recent decades. However, the
average tax rate under Paine’s plan would be substantially higher than 5% when wealthy people
accrue enormous windfalls, as occurred during the first year of the pandemic. Through its
responsiveness to rates of accrual, Paine’s tax would create a strong incentive for extreme wealth
holders to divide or otherwise dispose of the portion of their wealth that is above the revenue
cap.
Were it to be implemented in the 21st Century, Paine’s proposal would strictly limit
further accumulation by billionaires, and diminish the incentive to hoard wealth in the first place.
By stemming the tide of economic inequality, his proposal would reduce the outsized power of
wealth in political life. As we face the vital question of how to preserve and expand democracy
in the United States, we should reconsider a plan that dates nearly to the country’s founding:
Thomas Paine’s 100% marginal rate on the revenue from extreme wealth.
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